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1998 /U.S. Extension of the Sherman Act
I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment analyzes the application of United States antitrust laws to
wholly extraterritorial conduct. The United States First Circuit Court of Appeals
recently held in United States v. Nippon Paper that wholly extraterritorial conduct
which has substantial and intended effect within the United States may form the
basis for criminal prosecution under Section One of the Sherman Act.' This Com-
ment considers the impact of this decision on United States' efforts to achieve
effective transnational enforcement of antitrust laws between itself and Japan.
Part II explains the importance of effective transnational enforcement of antitrust
laws in an increasingly global economy.2 Part III details the particular need for the
United States to deal-with key antitrust issues between itself and Japan.3 It further
examines the key differences in each nation's approach to antitrust laws and the
development of these laws in each economic system as an impediment to effective
enforcement of antitrust laws between the two nations.4 Part IV discusses the
approaches utilized by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in enforcing
transnational antitrust violations and examines the effectiveness of each approach
as a tool in achieving effective transnational enforcement of antitrust laws.5 Part V
details the history of the United States application of the Sherman Act to extra-
territorial conduct during the past one hundred years.6 Part VI discusses Nippon
Paper, the recent federal court decision which extended the reach of the Sherman
Act to include criminal prosecution for wholly extraterritorial conduct with sub-
stantial and intended effect in the United States.7 This section further details the
reactions of United States and Japanese officials to this broad extension of the
Sherman Act.8 Part VII concludes that the Nippon Paper decision is an aggressive
approach to a delicate situation between the United States and Japan which may
1. See infra notes 176-244 and accompanying text (discussing the Nippon Paper decision, including
relevant facts, analysis, and reactions by U.S. and Japanese officials); see also United States v. Nippon Paper Indus.
Co., 109 F.3d I (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.CL 685 (1998).
2. See infra notes 10-22 and accompanying text (stating increased globalization has caused a concurrent
crisis in the transnational enforcement of antitrust law).
3. See infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text (explaining it is of particular importance that the United
States deal with key antitrust issues between itself and Japan because Japan is a leading U.S. trade partner and
because Japan has failed to effectively enforce its antitrust laws).
4. See infra notes 35-71 and accompanying text (noting basic differences in the economic systems of the
United States and Japan is an impediment to harmonization of antitrust laws between the U.S. and Japan).
5. See infra notes 72-143 and accompanying text (explaining the U.S. Department of Justice utilizes these
approaches: coordinated enforcement activity, positive comity, and application of U.S. antitrust laws).
6. See infra notes 144-75 and accompanying text (detailing the development of the U.S. Supreme Court's
view regarding the extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws).
7. See infra notes 176-235 and accompanying text (setting forth the relevant facts and analysis of the
Nippon Paper decision).
8. See infra notes 236-44 and accompanying text (noting the decision has sparked criticism by a number
of foreign nations, including Japan). Similarly, U.S. trade experts and economists have reservations about the
decision. Id.
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result in self-protective measures by Japan and an unwillingness on the part of the
Japanese government to continue efforts to achieve effective enforcement of
antitrust violations between the United States and Japan.9
II. INCREASED GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
The United States presently faces a crisis in the transnational enforcement of
law as a result of the recent explosion in international business. '° In today's global
economy, there is a need, more than ever, for effective transnational enforcement
of antitrust laws.' No single international antitrust law currently exists. Antitrust
laws in existence in many countries are often weak, unenforced, or non-existent. 13
As the economies of the world have grown increasingly global, there has also
been a marked increase in anticompetitive activity. 4 Anticompetitive cartels still
run rampant in many countries.' 5 Effective enforcement of antitrust laws against
violating individuals and corporations throughout the world is essential as a means
9. See infra notes 245-56 and accompanying text (concluding that the goal of the U.S., enforcement of
transnational antitrust violations through positive comity and coordinated enforcement action, may be hindered by
the Nippon Paper decision). However, this may be the only means by which the United States can protect American
consumers and corporations from Japan's failure to effectively enforce its antitrust laws. Id.
10. See Symposium: Cultural Conceptions of Competition: Article: Enforcing American Private Antitrust
Decisions in Japan: Is Comity Real? 44 DE PAUL L. REv. 1119 (1995) (stating "The explosion of international
business over the past twenty years has created a crisis in the transnational enforcement of law."); see also Laura
E. Keegan, The 1991 U.S./EC Competition Agreement: A Glimpse of the Future Through the United States v.
Microsoft Window, 2 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 149 (1996) (noting internationalization has increased competition
among corporations).
11. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 94 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "antitrust acts" as federal and state statutes
which protect trade and commerce from unlawful restraints, price discriminations, price-fixing and monopolies);
see also Julie A. Shepard, Comment, Using United States Antitrust Laws Against the Keiretsu as a Wedge into the
Japanese Market, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 345, 346 (1993) (quoting William P. Barr who said competition is
international in today's global economy); see also WoRLD ANTrrRUST LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE
MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND BUSINESs 7:50 (James J. Garrett, ed., Aspen Law & Business, 1997) [hereinafter
WORLD ANTITRUST] (stating the day has passed in which a company need be concerned only with the antitrust laws
of its own country).
12. See Joseph P. Griffin, EC/US Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Impact on Transnational Business, 24
LAW& POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1051, (1993); see also Symposium, supra note 10, at 1119 (referring to the lack of legal
standards in international law).
13. See John R. Wilke, Hunting Cartels, U.S. Trust-Busters Increasingly Target International Business,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1997, at Al (writing, "[aibroad, laws against collusion and price-fixing often are weak,
unenforced, or nonexistent").
14. See id. (explaining that U.S. prosecutors assert there is a rise in criminal price fixing and collusion which
has increased as the economy has grown global).
15. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY214 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "cartel" as" a combination of producers
of any product joined together to control its production, sale, and price, so as to obtain a monopoly and restrict
competition in any particular industry or commodity); see also Wilke, supra note 13, at Al (quoting Alan Wolfe,
a Washington lawyer for Kodak, who says that cartels still currently exist in many countries). Wolfe cites the steel
industry as an example, noting that U.S. steel producers claim that a cartel allocates the production of flat-rolled
steel among European and Asian companies. Id. The United States is currently attempting to nurture antitrust laws
in developing countries, such as Zimbabwe and Kazakhstan. Id.
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of protecting open and free markets, safeguarding consumers, and impeding
conduct that hinders competition.1 6 Free markets provide competition, and com-
petition provides an economy with the best allocation of resources. t7 The best
allocation of resources is beneficial to society as a whole.' 8 Antitrust law increases
consumer choice and enhances competitive prices.' 9 Antitrust law is particularly
relevant to the world economy because it is meant to protect competition, not
competitors.2 Both the DOJ and the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) have made the
enforcement of antitrust laws in the international arena a high priority.2' According
to United States Attorney General, Janet Reno, effective antitrust enforcement is
needed more today than ever before.22
III. UNrrED STATES AND JAPAN
A. Specific Need for Enforcement
It is particularly important that the United States deal with key antitrust issues
between itself and Japan.23 Japan is a leading U.S. trade partner and is the second
largest economy in the world.24 The increase in globalization has significantly
tipped towards Asia, and more specifically towards Japan.Y For example, over the
last twenty years in the high technology26 industry, Japan's exports have increased
16. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTrrRUST LAW DEvELOPMENT, APPENDIX D: 1995 DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS (4th ed. 1995) 1449, 1450 [hereinafter ANTIrRUST LAW DEV.].
17. Id.
18. a1L
19. IL
20. See Jiro Tamura, U.S. Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law to Japanese Keiretsu, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'LL. & POL. 385,386 (1993) (explaining U.S. antitrust laws protect the U.S. economy from both domestic and
international antitrust violations).
21. See ANITrRUSTLAWDEV., supra note 16, at 1450 (noting the DOJ and the FTC are the federal agencies
responsible for enforcing antitrust laws); see also Shepard, supra note 11, at 345 (maintaining the DOJ's policy
regarding antitrust law points to the importance of export trading and reflects the DOJ's intent to extend its
anticompetitive forces beyond the domestic aspects of United States trade).
22. See Bingaman Stresses Role of Antitrust in Markets with Evolving Technologies, 66 ANTITRUST &
TRADEREGILATIONS RPT. 3, Oct. 26, 1995 [hereinafterBingaman] (indicating in 1994 that United States Assistant
Attorney General, Anne K. Bingaman, said there is no reason to believe that recent technological advances will
eliminate the need for antitrust enforcement).
23. See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text (explaining that Japan is a leading U. S. trade partner, and
that its failure to effectively develop and enforce its antitrust laws hurts American consumers and corporations).
24. See Alex Y. Seita & Jiro Tamura, The Historical Background of Japan's Antimonopoly Law, 1994 U.
ILL. L. REV. 115 (1994) (stating tension between the United States and Japan over the last ten years has increased
steadily).
25. See Joel Klein & Preeta Bansal, InternationalAntitrust Enforcement in the Computer Jndustry, 41 VILL.
L. REV. 173, 180 (1996); see also Seita & Tamura, supra note 24, at 116 (noting Japan may be the United States'
newest economic threat given the demise of Soviet Communism).
26. See Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 180 (discussing primarily the computer industry when making
references to high technology).
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from seven percent to sixteen percent, while exports of the United States decreased
from approximately thirty percent to twenty-one percent.27 These numbers reflect
the major changes which have occurred in the last two decades between Japan and
the United States. United States officials cite Japan as the United States' trade
partner most fraught with anticompetitive activity.28 Japan has failed to effectively
develop and enforce antitrust laws to the extent desired by the United States.29 A
Japanese executive recently conceded to a U.S. court that it is common practice for
executives of competing Japanese corporations to meet on a routine basis and
discuss, among other issues, increasing market prices.3" Those companies not parti-
cipating in the anticompetitive activities are criticized.3' Although Japan has
developed broad and expansive competition laws, the actual application of these
laws is rare. 2 Violations of antitrust laws in Japan, and Japan's failure to enforce
its antitrust laws frequently affect American consumers and corporations. This
27. Id. at 181 (explaining further that the European Union's exports fell from 46% to approximately 37%)
Id. These figures represent exports in high technology exports. Id.
28. See Wilke, supra note 13, at Al (quoting Hideaki Kobayashi, an official of Japan's Fair Trade
Commission (JFTC), who stated although anticompetition laws are beginning to take affect in Japan, exemptions
to the anticompetition laws are abundant). JFIC currently must battle anticompetitive activity within its own
government. Id
29. See Antitrust: Head of Japan's FTC Asks Justice to ReconsiderAntitrust Decision, 73 DER A-4, April
15, 1992 [hereinafter Head of Japan's FTC] (noting in 1992 the United States Assistant Attorney General James
F. Rill, Chief of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, described Japan's Antimonopoly Law as not
effective enough). Attorney General Rill described Japan's maximum penalty for violations of the Antimonpoly
Law by corporations as significantly lower than those of the United States. I. In 1992, the maximum penalty for
corporate antitrust violations was US$77,000. Id. Compare Head of Japan's FTC with Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. §1 (1890) (as amended 15 U.S.C. §1 (1964)) stating:
[E]very person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding US$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, USS350,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
See also Seita & Tamura, supra note 24, at 122 (maintaining that the American perception that Japan has failed to
enforce its Antimonopoly Law in a reasonable manner is inaccurate). The Antimonopoly Law was completely
foreign to the Japanese government when it was imposed upon it during the occupation. Id. Another reason for the
American misconception may be that Japan enforces the Antimonopoly Law through nontransparent methods, i.
For example, violators of the Antimonopoly Law often receive warnings or notifications of possible violations. Id.
The JFrC rarely enforces the AML through the use of agency decisions or judicial cases. Id. Americans
misunderstand the lack of judicial decisions and interpret this as a failure to enforce the Antimonopoly Law. id
30. See Wiflke, supra note 13, at Al.
31. Id
32. See Symposium, supra note 10, at 1122 (noting the incongruity between Japan's broad competition laws
and its limited application of those laws); see also FTC Hearings on Enforcement Policy Delve into Dynamics of
Global Rivalry, 69 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REGULATIONS REPORT, Oct. 26, 1995 [hereinafter FTC Hearings]
(comparing convictions for antitrust violations in developed countries). Between 1982 and 1992, the United States,
with its strict enforcement of antitrust laws, completed 879 convictions. Id. In contrast, during the same years, Japan
produced only two convictions for violations of its Antimonopoly Law. Id.
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makes it more difficult for U.S. corporations to enter the Japanese market,33 and
results in increased prices for American consumers.34
B. Obstacles to Effective Enforcement
One explanation for the United States' inability to harmonize its antitrust laws
with those of Japan may be the inherent differences in their economic systems.35
Basic differences in antitrust theories are substantial impediments to harmonization
of antitrust laws between the United States and Japan.36 "[M]ost nations regard
antitrust law as nearly constitutional in significance and as an expression of their
fundamental national ethos." 37
The U.S. economy developed around and remains based upon anticompetitive
and free market theories.38 For over a hundred years, antitrust law has been the ulti-
mate protector of the competitive process in the United States.39 Antitrust law is
essential to the United States' free market economy.40 When the United States was
formed in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the Founders clung tightly to
Puritan notions of freedom, individualism, and democracy.41 The Founders
criticized centralization of power and valued individual freedom and free com-
petition.42 These Puritan ideals were incorporated into the early American common
law which forbade monopolistic activity.43 The Sherman Act codified the common
33. See Shepard, supra note 11, at 347 (stating the United States government believes that the keiretsu
practices, common in the Japanese system of business, are an obstacle to those American corporations trying to
enter the Japanese market); see also FTC Hearings, supra note 32, at 487 (explaining that according to Thomas
R. Howell, a representative for the Coalition for Open Trade (COT), United States corporations are at a great
disadvantage to Japanese corporations because of differences in each country's antitrust laws and enforcement of
those laws). Howell cites this as "by far the most important impediment to increasing U.S. sales in Japan." Id. The
COT addresses "the problems presented for U.S. competitiveness by private anticompetitive practices in
anticompetitive markets." Id.
34. See Wilke, supra note 13, at Al (noting the meetings among Japanese owned paper manufacturers dis-
cussing prices, new products, and major orders resulted in a ten percent increase in prices for Americans); see also
Seita & Tamura, supra note 24, at 116 (explaining the prevailing American perspective is that Japan's failure to
enforce its antitrust laws results in American corporations' inability to enter the Japanese market).
35. See Spencer W. Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 348
(1997) (setting forth that "[n]ational differences impose significant limitations on harmonization").
36. See id. (noting that overcoming these obstacles is an impediment to the future of transnational
enforcement of antitrust law).
37. Id.
38. See generally Hiroshi Iyori, A Comparison of U.S.-Japan Antitrust Law: Looking at the International
Harmonization of Competition Law, 4 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'YJ. 59 (1995) (detailing key differences in antitrust law
between the United States and Japan).
39. See ANTrrRUSTLAWDEV., supra note 16, at 1450.
40. IL
41. See Iyori, supra note 38, at 62.
42. Id. (noting that individual freedom and free competition were foundations of the English common law
in the 17th Century and these notions were incorporated into the United States antitrust laws).
43. Id. (indicating at the end of the nineteenth century the common law prohibited all agreements which
restricted free trade). The Sherman Act then codified the common law to guarantee free competition. Id.
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law in 1890.44 Since then, the United States has continued to uphold its antitrust
laws as essential to a free market.45 Antitrust law is regarded as being as central to
the United States free market economy as the Bill of Rights is to civil freedom.
46
The Supreme Court has even referred to antitrust law in the United States as the
"Magna Carta of capitalism."
47
In contrast, there is a tendency in Japan to think in terms of the group.48 The
Japanese government believed that cartels benefitted society.49 Historically, the
Japanese economic system centered around "zaibatsu," which means literally a
wealth group. 0 The zaibatsu consisted of combinations of up to hundreds of
businesses controlled by one holding company.5' Those companies which com-
prised the zaibatsu worked together for the betterment of the top holding company,
rather than for the betterment of the individual businesses.52 The zaibatsu's primary
goal was to achieve oligopolist positions of somewhere between ten and twenty
percent of the market output in various industries. 53 A common characteristic of the
classic zaibatsu in Japan was control by a single family or a few families, and strong
loyalty to the families and the zaibatsu.54
The zaibatsu reached its official demise during the United States' occupation
of Japan at the end of World War 1 .5' General MacArthur ordered the dissolution
of the zaibatsu, in particular, of all holding companies, viewing them as a sub-
44. Id. (noting antitrust activities increased during the Industrial Revolution).
45. Id. at 63.
46. See Wilke, supra note 13, at Al (noting antitrust rules are accepted in the United States). The Supreme
Court referred to the antitrust laws of the United States as central to economic freedom. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Iyon, supra note 38, at 64 (explaining American competition which was comprised of many small
businesses competing amongst one another did not impress Japanese officials); see also Harry First, Antitrust
Enforcement in Japan, 64 ANTrrRUST L. J. 137, 145 (1995) (noting antitrust law was alien to Japan's regulatory
culture).
49. See Iyori, supra note 38, at 64 (explaining the Japanese government once legalized cartels and viewed
them as a benefit to society); see also Seita & Tamura, supra note 24, at 138 (indicating the Japanese government
had a bias towards big business).
50. See JAPAN, ACOUNTRYSTUDY576 (Robert E. Dolan & Robert L. Worden eds., 5th ed. 1st prtg. Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress 1992) [hereinafter COUNTRY STUDY] (defining zaibatsu as "powerful
industrial or financial combines that merged during the Meigi era and were implicated in the militarist regimes of
the 1930s and 1940s").
51. See Shepard, supra note 11, at348 (explaining zaibatsu consisted of a"central holding company which
acted as the control center for directing a unified business strategy for a large complex of companies, including
other holding companies").
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Seita & Tamura, supra note 24, at 140 (comparing the zaibatsu system to a feudalistic system in
which employees throughout the hierarchical system owed a duty to the controlling family).
55. See Shepard, supra note 11, at 349; see also COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 50, at 576 (explaining central
holding companies dissolved, and the families and owners of the zaibatsu were indemnified with non-negotiable
government bonds). Mitsubishi, Sumimoto and Mitsui were the principal zaibatsu in Japan. Id.
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stantial obstacle to the democratization of Japan.56 In place of the zaibatsu,
however, the "keiretsu" system developed and became a far more efficient and
competitive economic system.57 The restructuring of the Japanese economy was
achieved through the enactment of the Antimonopoly Laws, a combination of
American competition laws.58 Japan, shortly after the close of World War II,
amended the Antimonopoly Laws, thereby allowing for the creation of the keiretsu,
the system upon which the Japanese economy is largely based today.
59
Business in Japan is based in part upon the keiretsu, a system of business
arrangements of industrial groupings which have developed in the Japanese eco-
nomy.60 The industrial groupings are comprised of companies connected together
through various formal and informal institutions. 6' This system is more efficient
than the zaibatsu; it replaced the family owned zaibatsu with a more competitive
system developed and organized around a controlling bank rather than controlling
families.62 The keiretsu often consist of large manufacturing firms, central trading
companies, insurance companies, and trust banks.63 The large trading companies
oversee the activity and organization of the keiretsu and thereby increase the
effectiveness of the keiretsu.6 Common characteristics of the keiretsu are networks
of debt capital, stable shareholding and cross-shareholding, common traditions and
shared corporate assets.65
U.S. businesses assert that the keiretsu business system is an obstacle to com-
panies attempting to enter the Japanese market.6 The United States has repeatedly
urged Japan to restructure the keiretsu business system.67 At the Structural Impedi
56. See Shepard, supra note 11, at 349 (noting some Americans also viewed the zaibatsu as having
influenced Japan to enter the World War II).
57. See Seita & Tamura, supra note 24, at 185 (explaining the keiretsu replaced the zaibatsu and became
a far more efficient system than the zaibatsu). It is ironic that the United States' destruction of the "zaibatsu" made
possible the commencement of the far more effective keiretsu system. Id.; see also Shepard, supra note 11, at 349.
58. See Shepard, supra note 11, at 349 (stating the Antimonopoly Law consisted of parts of the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act).
59. See Seita & Tamura, supra note 24, at 118 (explaining the Japanese Antimonopoly Law is the principal
law regulating anticompetitive activity in Japan and is similar to U.S. antitrust laws).
60. See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the keiretsu business system in the
Japanese economy and its impact on U.S. businesses attempting to enter the Japanese market).
61. See Mitsuo Matsushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative: An Example of Bilateral Trade
Negotiation, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 436,436 n.7 (1991) (defining keiretsu relationships as "closely-tied corporate
relationships characterized by mutual stock-holdings, interlocking directorates, and the like."); see also Shepard,
supra note 11, at 347.
62. See Seita & Tamura, supra note 24, at 154 (explaining the keiretsu were more competitive in the global
market than the family owned zaibatsu empires).
63. See Shepard, supra note 11, at 350 (noting that there are two classifications of keiretsu: inter-market
keiretsu and intra-market keiretsu).
64. lIa
65. Il at 347.
66. See Tamura, supra note 20, at 399; see also Shepard, supra note 11, at 347.
67. See Shepard, supra note 11, at 347 (noting the United States has requested the Japanese government
make its market more accessible to foreign corporations attempting to enter its market). See also Matsushita, supra
note 61, at 443 (explaining the United States government argued at the Structural Impediments Initiative talks the
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ments Initiative (SIt) talks of 1990, the United States and Japan discussed the
keiretsu system and the United States called for an end to the system.
68
The inherent differences in antitrust theories may well be the greatest obstacle
to the harmonization of antitrust laws between the United States and Japan.69
Antitrust law is a cherished set of public values, and not a series of neutral theories,
upon which all nations can agree as long as they attempt to agree in good faith and
communicate as effectively as possible.70 The differences between the United States
and Japan in economic theories makes harmonization of antitrust laws between the
two countries particularly difficult.
7
'
IV. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROACHES To TRANSNATIONAL ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT
In its efforts to achieve effective enforcement of transnational antitrust
violations, the DOJ recognizes and utilizes, in varying degrees, three approaches:
(1) coordinated enforcement actions; (2) positive comity; and (3) application of U.S.
laws to conduct occurring abroad.72
A. Coordinated Enforcement Activity
Coordinated enforcement activity is the most promising approach presently
utilized by the DOJ in its enforcement of transnational antitrust violations.73
Coordination of antitrust enforcement involves nations strictly enforcing their own
national competition laws and simultaneously cooperating to provide other nations
with the tools necessary to prevent transnational anticompetitive behavior.74 This
keiretsu system impedes the entry of foreign businesses into Japan's domestic market).
68. See Matsushito, supra note 61, at 436 (defining the Structural Impediments Initiative Talks as a series
of bilateral trade negotiations completed in 1990); see also Seita & Tamura, supra note 24, at 120 (indicating the
aim of the Structural Impediments Initiative talks was to change the economic practices of countries which
negatively impact other countries). The Structural Impediments Initiative talks were initiated, in part, because of
perceptions by U.S. officials that the trade imbalance between the United States and Japan was a result of
oligopolistic practices within Japan. ld.
69. See Waller, supra note 35, at 348.
70. Id.
71. See Symposium, supra note 10, at 1119 (reporting the lack of international antitrust laws leads parties
to wrestle with conflicts created by diversified business cultures and consider the importance of competition laws
to each sovereign); see also Waller, supra note 35, at 348.
72. Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 185.
73. See Seung Wha Chang, Extraterritorlal Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Other Pacific Countries:
Proposed Bilateral Agreements for Resolving International Conflicts Within the Pacific Community, 16 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 295,309 (1993) (explaining many commentators urge bilateral treaties are the best approach
to the transnational enforcement of antitrust violations); see also Klein & Bansal, supra note 25 at 185.
74. See Wilbur L. Fugate, Book Review, World Antitrust law & Practice. By James J. Garrett, General
Editor. Boston Massachusetts: Little, Brown & Co. (1995)(LOOSE LEAF), 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 503,504 (1996)
(stating recent international attempts at coordination and shared information have been more successful than efforts
in the past). But see Waller, supra note 35, at 345 (noting the coordination approach is not perfect because it
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method of enforcement allows individual nations to pursue their own investigations
to the extent necessary and to receive the benefits of efforts by other countries in
fact gathering and remedial measures.75 In the fall of 1996, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), consisting of twenty-eight
nations, including Japan, commenced efforts on an agreement regarding effective
coordination and enforcement policies.76 Japan's efforts to improve scholarship
within its academic community signifies a clear attempt by Japan to increase co-
ordination through more efficient discussion regarding transnational antitrust
issues."
The OECD is a key forum for discussion of transnational antitrust issues and
is especially effective in its efforts to coordinate enforcement activity in antitrust
law.78 The OECD's accomplishments in this area are many. For example, the OECD
arranges meetings between antitrust officials of foreign nations and produces
studies relevant to antitrust regulation.79 The OECD also wrote the Recom-
mendation of the Council Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on
Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade (Recommendation) for
member countries detailing how to effectively handle transnational antitrust
violations.80 The OECD first set forth its Recommendation in 1967 and most
recently revised the Recommendation in 1995.1 The Preamble to the Recom-
mendation explains nations "should co-operate in the implementation of their
respective national legislation in order to combat the harmful effects of anti-
competitive practices, ' ,82 and it encourages "notification, exchange of information,
coordination of action, consultation and conciliation."8" While the Recommendation
is regarded as having had limited success, 4 it is important because it provides a
requires coordination and agreement among different antitrust enforcement systems of various countries).
75. See Fugate, supra note 74, at 504 (noting the International Antitrust Enforcement Act, enacted in 1994,
allows federal antitrust agencies to obtain evidence requested by foreign nations which will be used in enforcing
antitrust violations). For the Act to be implemented, requesting countries must also enact laws which allow federal
agencies to receive relevant evidence from the requesting country. Id. See Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 185.
76. Wilke, supra note 13, at Al.
77. See Tamura, supra note 20, at 402 (explaining increased scholarship in antitrust law in Japan significs
efforts to broaden the dialogue regarding transnational enforcement of antitrust law). A common understanding of
the fundamental goals will aid in focusing discussion on key antitrust issues. Id.
78. See Waller, supra note 35, at 361 (noting the OECD was originally founded to assist the implementation
of the Marshall Plan).
79. See Fugate, supra note 74, at 505 (explaining the four volume Guide to Legislation on Restrictive
Practices, comprised of the antitrust laws of OECD member countries, was published by the OECD Competition
and Consumer Policy Committee); see also Waller, supra note 35, at 361.
80. See Organizationforeconomic Cooperation and Development, Revised Recommendation ofthe Council
Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade,
35 I.L.M. 1313 (1996) [hereinafter Revised Recommendation].
81. See Waller, supra note 35, at361.
82. See Revised Recommendation, supra note 80, at 1315.
83. Id.
84. See Waller, supra note 35, at 361(explaining that efforts to achieve coordination on a multilateral basis
have been of limited success).
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framework for the more common form of coordination, known as the bilateral
agreement. 5
The most common form of antitrust coordination is the bilateral agreement.
86
In 1995, the United States and Canada exemplified successful implementation of
a bilateral agreement when they signed an agreement which set forth tools by which
the two nations could achieve cooperation with regard to transnational antitrust
issues." This agreement mandates that the United States and Canada, among other
requirements, share information regarding enforcement of antitrust activities and
coordinate enforcement.8 8 The United States and Canada also entered into an
agreement in 1985 which called for increased cooperation in criminal prosecution
of antitrust violations. 9 This agreement, the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance on
Criminal Matters (MLAT), requires that U.S. and Canadian officials give one
another support in issues pertaining to the investigation, prosecution, and sup-
pression of certain activity.9°
Recent cases demonstrate the effectiveness of coordination as a tool in the
enforcement of transnational antitrust violations.9 For example, coordinated en-
forcement tactics between the United States and Europe made an effective remedy
possible in the Microsoft case.' The United States and a Microsoft competitor in
Europe simultaneously took action against Microsoft; the Microsoft competitor
lodged its complaint in the European Commission.93 The United States charged,
among other things, that Microsoft entered into excessively long licensing agree-
ments, thereby precluding competitors from entering the market.94 The European
market for high technology items is dynamic and growing at a rapid pace.95 An
85. Id. at 362.
86. Il.
87. See generally Waller, supra note 35 (discussing cooperation agreements between the United States and
Canada); see also Agreement Regarding the Application of Their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practice
Laws, Aug. 1 & 3, 1995, U.S.-CAN., 35 LL.M. 309 (1995) [hereinafter U.S.-CAN. AGREEMENT].
88. See id. art. VII, 35 LL.M. at 320.
89. See generally Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-CAN., 24
I.L.M. 1092 (1985) [hereinafter MLAT].
90. See id. art. H (2), 24 I.L.M. at 1093 (requiring the parties assist one another in other ways, including:
(a) examining objects and sites; (1) exchanging information and objects; (c) locating or identifying persons; (d)
serving documents; (e) taking the evidence of persons; (f) providing documents and records; (g) transferring persons
in custody; (h) executing requests for searches and seizures). Id.
91. See infra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (referring to the recent Microsoft case and the series of
plastic dinnerware cases to demonstrate the effectiveness of coordination in the enforcement of transnational
antitrust violations).
92. See Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 180 (explaining coordinated enforcement activity ensured an
effective remedy in the international computer software industry).
93. See Keegan, supra note 10, at 168 (stating this activity was the first coordinated activity by the United
States and European Commission in enforcing antitrust violations).
94. See id. at 169 (noting the DOJ's complaint against Microsoft had three separate grounds for illegal
monopolization, including exclusionary per processor licenses, unreasonably long licenses, and restrictive
nondisclosure agreements).
95. See Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 179.
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effective remedy necessitated coordination between the United States and Europe;
an agreement extending to Microsoft's conduct in the United States and allowing
Microsoft to continue its anticompetitive activity in foreign markets would have
been inadequate.96 The United States and the Commission of the European
Communities (EC) entered into an Agreement regarding the application of their
competition laws on September 23,1991 (Agreement)97 with the intent to overcome
problems in the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws.98 The Agreement
benefitted both the United States and the EC as both received and offered assistance
in the evidence gathering and prosecution.9 The Agreement similarly helped
Microsoft as it did not have concerns that an agreement entered with the United
States may put Microsoft at a disadvantage when negotiating with the EC, as the
agreement with the United States could potentially be -used as leverage against
Microsoft in its negotiations with the EC.t0° The Agreement effectively carried out
the goals of both the United States and the EC during the course of the Microsoft
investigation.10'
Another instance demonstrating the effectiveness of coordinated enforcement
action is the recent series of plastic dinnerware cases.0 2 Coordination was key to
the prosecution of a price-fixing cartel in the US$100 million plastic dinnerware in-
dustry.'03 The exchange of confidential information between the United States and
Canada made possible the execution of search warrants necessary in prosecuting the
price-fixing cartel."t 4 As a result of the cooperation between the United States and
Canada, enforcement agencies seized essential evidence and seven executives and
96. See Keegan, supra note 10, at 186 (explaining that the Microsoft investigation involved great efficiency
in information gathering); see also Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 180 (explaining a remedy which extended only
to Microsoft's activities in the United States would have been ineffective as it would have allowed Microsoft to
continue its anticompetitive activity in Europe, thereby blocking access to markets abroad).
97. See generally Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission
of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-EUR.
COMM., 30 I.L.M. 1491 [hereinafter U.S.-E.C. COMP. LAW AGREEMENT].
98. See Keegan, supra note 10, at 158 (noting the purpose of the agreement, to overcome problems in the
transnational application of antitrust laws, can be divided into three areas). These areas are: "(1) conflicts between
competition authorities, (2) obstacles to information-gather in a foreign jurisdiction, (3) differing rules under which
multinational firms must abide"). ld.; see also U.S.-E.C. COMP. LAW AGREEMENT, supra note 97, at 1492, art. I
("The purpose of this agreement is to promote cooperation and coordination and lessen the possibility or impact
of differences between the parties in the application of their competition laws").
99. See Keegan, supra note 10, at 173 (noting that the Agreement helped authorities reach settlements in
both jurisdictions).
100. See id. (explaining that Microsoft asked that the United States include the EC in negotiations regarding
the consent decree so that both Microsoft investigations would end at the same time).
101. See Keegan, supra note 10, at 174.
102. See Plastic Dinnerware Price Fixing Probe Nets Indictment, Guilty Plea Agreements, 66 ANTrrRUST
& TRADE REGULATIONS REPORT 661 (June 16, 1994) [hereinafter Plastic Dinnerware Price Fixing] (discussing
the conspiracy among plastic dinnerware executives to defraud purchasers of plastic dinnerware). One indictment
charged a plastic dinnerware company with conspiracy to raise prices of products sold to Delta Airlines, Inc.. Id.
103. See Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 182.
104. See Plastic Dinnerware Price Fixing, supra note 102 (stating the United States FBI and the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police engaged in coordinated raids).
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three corporations pled guilty.1 05 If the search warrants had not been executed
simultaneously as a result of cooperation between the United States and Canada,
important evidence likely would have been lost as coconspirators in one country
could have informed fellow conspirators in the other country of impending investi-
gation.t Janet Reno commended the coordinated enforcement activity between the
United States and Canada saying, 'This is the kind of international cooperation that
is urgently needed in an age of shrinking borders and international antitrust con-
spiracies. ' °
B. Positive Comity
A second approach recognized by the DOJ towards effective enforcement of
transnational violations of antitrust law is positive comity.'"8 According to the rules
of positive comity, one nation asks the enforcement agency of another nation to
commence enforcement activity and to give notice of its advancements into the
requesting country." This approach is not without limitations. tt For positive
comity to be an effective tool, it requires that the country involved have its own
effective anticompetition laws which deem illegal those things which the Sherman
Act deems illegal."' The anticompetition laws of the foreign nation must also
provide for penalties substantial enough to deter the offending individual or
corporation.11 2 Furthermore, the foreign nation must have a political climate free
105. See Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 182 (noting the three corporations were fined over U.S. $9 million
and the individuals received prison sentences).
106. Il
107. See Plastic Dinnerware Price Fixing, supra note 102 (noting Reno expressed gratitude to the Canadian
government, saying, "We are grateful to the Canadian government").
108. See Edieth Y. Wu, United States Application of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 10 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 1,
6 (1997) (defining comity as the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive
or judicial acts of another nation having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws); see also Klein & Bansal, supra note
25, at 186.
109. See ANTITRUST LAW DEV., supra note 16, at 1469 (explaining comity is respect of other sovereigns).
When determining whether it is appropriate to assert jurisdiction, the agencies consider interests of other sovereigns.
Id. Factors which the agencies consider in performing a positive comity analysis include, but are not limited to, "(1)
the relative significance to the alleged violation of conduct within the United States, as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct; (3) the presence or absence of a purpose
to affect U.S. consumers, markets, or exporters; (4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the
conduct on the United States as compared to the effects abroad." Id. See also Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 186.
110. Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 187.
111. See ANTrrRUSTLAWDE.,supra note 16, at 1470 (explaining the federal agency inquires first whether
the activity is prescribed by the law of the interested country). Oftentimes, the law is the same as U.S. law and there
is no conflict as more countries are now adopting antitrust law similar to that of the United States. Id.; see also
Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 187 (noting that this approach is most effective when the activity occurred in one
jurisdiction).
112. See Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 187 (declaring that the penalties must be high enough to dissuade
companies from engaging in anticompetitive activity so that potential profits are not higher than possible penalties).
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from political pressure, allowing the nation to freely enforce its antitrust laws which
may, at times, be more advantageous to foreign individuals or corporations.1
3
Positive comity as an instrument to the enforcement of antitrust laws has been
successful in many situations.1 4 Efforts in this area are paying off; there is a new
global interest in anticompetition law.' Efforts in positive comity with Japan have
proven to be relatively successful." 6 The JFTC in 1995 established the Import
Restraint Task Force, intended to encourage investigation and prosecution of anti-
competitive activity.11 7 Experts hope this reflects a true commitment by the
Japanese government to routinely and effectively eliminate violations of its antitrust
laws.18 The United States continues its efforts with hopes of establishing an
effective system for enforcing antitrust violations in Japan." 9 The United States
urged the Ruling Party's Administrative Reform Team, a team of Diet members, to
augment the staff and resources of the JFTC so as to make the antitrust enforcement
capabilities of Japan equal to its status as one of the largest economies of the
world. 20 The United States government also advocates the Japanese government
should enhance the JFTC's administrative status, making it possible for the JFrC
to better interact with industrial ministries in the enforcement of anticompetition
law.'21 Ultimately, this would increase the JFrC's effectiveness in enforcing
anticompetition violations."
C. Application of United States Antitrust Laws
The third approach utilized by the DOJ involves the direct application of United
States antitrust laws to foreign antitrust violations.'t 3 A recent decision by the
113. See ANrrRUST LAW DEV., supra note 16, at 1471 (noting that the agencies also consider whether the
country encourages the activity, forbids the activity, or adopts a neutral stance); see also Klein & Bansal, supra note
25, at 187.
114. See Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 187.
115. See id. (stating that nearly one-third of all countries in the world and 8% of the world's GDP have now
enacted some sort of anticompetition law).
116. See id. at 189 (indicating that although much still needs to be done to assure that the JFrC will
effectively enforce domestic antitrust violations, there has been progress with Japan through the United States'
efforts by positive comity).
117. Id
118. Id at 189.
119. Id
120. See HmORsm ODA, JAPANFSE LAW 33 (Butterworth Legal Publishers 1993) (explaining that the Diet is
the supreme body of state power in Japan); see also Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 189 (noting the Ruling
Party's Administrative Reform Project Team suggests the implementation of legislation which would increase the
effectiveness of the JFrc).
121. See Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 189.
122. Id.
123. See William K. Walker, Recent Development - Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws: The
Effect of the European Community-United States Antitrust Agreement-Agreement Between the Government of
the United States ofAmerica and the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their
Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, 30 LhM. 1487 (1991), 33 HARV. INT'L L. J. 583,584 (1991) (explaining that
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United States First Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Nippon Paper, is
argued, by many, to be yet another example of the overzealous approach by the
United States to the application of its antitrust laws to extraterritorial violations.124
This Comment discusses fully in Section VI the Nippon Paper decision which held
criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act may be based on wholly extraterritorial
activity.' 25 This approach is the least effective of the three and is regarded by many
as one of last resort.126 Academicians cite application of U.S. antitrust laws as the
final alternative in efforts to achieve effective enforcement of transnational antitrust
violations. 27 This approach increases the use of self-protective measures128 by
foreign nations and does little to stimulate effective solutions. For example, Japan
warned prosecution in the Nippon Paper decision, and the other fax-paper cases,
could gravely undermine Japan's efforts to harmonize its antitrust laws with those
of the United States. 129 The U.S. approach to extraterritorial application of its laws
has been described as zealous, protectionist, and imperialistic. 30 Others describe the
United States' application of its laws to foreign nations as a blatant disregard for
foreign sovereign's sovereignty 3 1 and as having passed beyond generally accepted
principles of international law. 132
Other nations also maintain laws which allow antitrust authorities to enforce
violations of its antitrust laws when the violation involves wholly extraterritorial
activity having substantial effect within the nation. 3 3 The Court of Justice of the
the most common justification for the United States' application of its laws to foreign conduct is territoriality, a
theory giving authority to a nation to apply its laws to activity occurring within its own borders). Another
justification is nationality which permits a state to apply its laws to its own citizens, notwithstanding the locus of
the conduct. Id.
124. See infra notes 236-44 and accompanying text (discussing the reactions by both U.S. and Japanese
officials to the Nippon Paper decision). Japanese officials warn that this is a violation of international law. ld. U.S.
economists warn that assertion of jurisdiction can create foreign policy conflicts and forbearance is appropriate in
certain circumstances. Id.
125. See infra notes 176-235 and accompanying text (discussing the Nippon Paper decision, including the
relevant facts and analysis).
126. See Chang, supra note 73, at 309 (noting many commentators argue diplomatic negotiation and bilateral
agreements are better solutions than application of U.S. laws to foreign anticompetitive activity), see also Klein
& Bansal, supra note 25, at 192 (emphasizing international sensitivities and difficulties in obtaining necessary
evidence make this the approach of last resort).
127. See Tamura, supra note 20, at403 (citing alternatives to application of U.S. laws to foreign conduct such
as international cooperation, treaties or multilateral agreement). Another alternative is positive comity in which the
United States could urge the JFTC to enforce the Antimonopoly Law. Id.
128. See infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text (detailing the self-protective measures which have
developed in Japan which can and most likely will be used to block U.S. judgments against Japanese defendants).
129. See Wilke, supra note 13, at Al (stating Japan is currently making efforts to coordinate its laws and
cooperate with the United States in the enforcement of transnational anticompetitive activity).
130. See Wu, supra note 108, at 20 (citing a tax case in which the United States proceeded to assert
jurisdiction despite the fact that the case fell outside U.S. borders and the effect in the United States was slight).
131. Id.
132. Id. at26.
133. See infra note 134 and accompanying text (providing an example of a situation in which a country
extended the jurisdictional reach of its laws to wholly extraterritorial activity with substantial effect in said country).
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European Communities, for example, established in In re Wood Pulp Cartel v. E.
C. Commission (Wood Pulp) that extraterritorial activity with substantial effect in
the European Community comes within the jurisdictional reach of the European
Court of Justice."34
Many foreign nations resort to protective measures such as blocking statutes t35
as an obstacle to application of foreign antitrust laws. 36 Article 200 of the Japanese
Civil Procedure Act, 37 for example, establishes preconditions which must be met
before the Japanese court will deem the judgment of a foreign court binding.'3 1
Article 200 of the Civil Procedure Act sets forth the following conditions which
must be met before a Japanese Court will deem a foreign judgment binding on a
Japanese corporation or individual: (1) that jurisdiction of the foreign court is not
denied by laws and orders or by treaty; (2) that the defendant defeated, being a
Japanese citizen, has received service of summons or any other necessary orders to
commence procedure otherwise by a public notice or has appeared without
receiving service thereof; (3) that the judgment of a foreign court is not contrary to
the public order or good morals in Japan; (4) that there is a mutual guarantee. 39
Thus, a judgment deemed "contrary to the public order or good values" could
potentially be held invalid. 40 This gives wide latitude to the Japanese court in
134. See In re Wood Pulp Cartel: A Ahistrom Oy v. Commission, 1988 ECR5193, reprinted in [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) P14, 491 91988) (involving 41 producers of wood pulp engaged in
a conspiracy to fix prices). Non-European Community wood pulp producers conspired to fix prices and increased
prices within the European Community. The participants in the conspiracy were located in Finland, the United
States and Canada. d The In re Wood Pulp court noted, "The effect of the agreements and practices on prices
announced and/or charged to customers on resale of pulp within the EEC was therefore not only substantial but
intended, and was the primary and direct result of the agreements and practices."Id.; see also Deanna Conn,
Assessing the Impact of Preferential Trade Agreements and New Rules of Origin on the Extraterritorial Application
of Antitrust Law to International Mergers, 93 COLu .L. REv. 119, 133 (1993) (recognizing a number of authors
cite In re Wood Pulp for its extension of the territorial reach of European law).
135. See Michael G. Mckinnon, Federal Judicial and Legislative Jurisdiction Over Entities Abroad: The
Long-Arm of U.S. Antitrust Law and Viable Solutions Beyond the 7imberlanelRestatement Comity Approach, 21
PEPP. L. REV. 1219, 1268 (1994) (explaining there are two types of blocking statutes, discovery blocking statutes
and judgment blocking statutes). Discovery blocking statutes limit the ability of the United States to obtain or
compel the production of evidence. Id. Judgment blocking statutes limit the enforcement of United States
judgments. Id.
136. See Chang, supra note 73, at 319 (explaining blocking statutes can promote international conflict when
the United States attempts to apply its antitrust laws to foreign conduct); see also Wu, supra note 108, at 24 (noting
U.S. aggressiveness in the application of its laws to foreign nations has led many foreign nations to enact protective
measures, such as blocking statutes). "These laws counter sovereign's efforts to extend jurisdiction beyond their
borders and protect rights that said country prescribes as inherent"); Id. Australia, Canada, Britain, and France are
among those countries which have enacted blocking statutes. Id.
137. See generally MINSOHO, Act. No. 61 (1926).
138. See Chang, supra note 73, at 302 (citing a Korean blocking statute, Article 203 of the Korean Civil
Procedure Act). This is another statute which will likely be used to impede foreign judgments. Id. The blocking
statute will most often be used in situations in which the United States judgment involves treble damages or in
which the United States granted jurisdiction on an extremely liberal standard. Id. The relevant Korean Civil
Procedure Act is modeled after Article 200 of the Japanese Civil Procedure Act. Id.
139. See generally MINSOHO, Act No. 61 (1926).
140. See Chang, supra note 73, at 302.
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determining whether preconditions have been met and whether it is appropriate to
uphold thejudgmentby a foreign nation against a Japanese defendant. The Japanese
court determines whether the foreign judgment meets the preconditions set forth by
the Article. 41 Originally, the purpose of these requirements was not to block United
States judgments based on antitrust laws.' 42 Nonetheless, there is a strong likelihood
that the provision will be utilized as a mechanism to impede United States judg-
ments against Japanese defendants.
43
V. HISTORY: THE SHERMAN ACT APPLIED To EXTRATERMTORiAL CoNDuCT
The U.S. view regarding the extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws has
changed dramatically in the past one hundred years. 44 The Sherman Antitrust Act,
the key United States anticompetition statute, is broad in its language and
ambiguous as to its application to foreign nations. 41 This places a special inter-
pretive responsibility upon the judiciary.'46 In light of this, U.S. Courts have played
a substantial role in the development of law regarding extraterritorial application
of the Sherman Act."4 The U.S. view regarding this issue has evolved from the
141. Id. at 301.
142. Id. at 302.
143. Id" at 310 (noting for example, a U.S. judgment permitting recovery oftreble damages against a Japanese
corporation may be considered, "contrary to the public order or good morals in Japan" and thereby could be held
invalid). The Japanese courts may also utilize this provision if U.S. Courts use unreasonably liberal standards of
venue or personal jurisdiction in order to drag Japanese defendants into U.S. Courts. Id.
144. See James W. Perkins, Comment, In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation: Sovereign
Compulsion, Acts of State, and the Extraterritorial Reach of the United States Antitrust Laws, 36 AM. U. L. REV.
721,724 (1987) (explaining the Sherman Act is an essential element of the U.S. economy). The purpose of the
Sherman Act is to maintain free competition. Id.; see also infra notes 150-75 and accompanying text (discussing
the United States Supreme Court's view regarding application of U.S. antitrust laws to wholly extraterritorial
conduct). The Supreme Court originally held that the Sherman Act should not extend beyond the borders of the
United States. Id. In its most recent decision, the Court held that activities committed abroad having substantial and
intended effects within the United States may form the basis for criminal prosecution pursuant to § 1 of the Sherman
Act. Id.
145. BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY 1377 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "Sherman Antitrust Act" as an act which
"prohibits any unreasonable interference, by contract, or combination, or conspiracy, with the ordinary, usually and
freely competitive price or distribution system of the open market in interstate trade"); See also Sherman Antitrust
Act 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) (as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964)) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination orconspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding US$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, US$350,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.") Id.
146. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 685
(1998) (writing in a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Lynch wrote, "The broad general language of the federal
antitrust laws and their unilluminating legislative history place a special interpretive responsibility upon the
judiciary... As Professors Areeda and Turner have said, the federal courts have been invested with a jurisdiction
to create and develop an antitrust law in the manner of the common law courts.").
147. See infra notes 150-79 and accompanying text (explaining the development of the United States
Supreme Court's approach to application of the Sherman Act to wholly extraterritorial activity).
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notion that the Sherman Act should not extend beyond the borders of the United
States,t48 to the tenuous position recently enunciated by the First Circuit in United
States v. Nippon Paper that activities committed abroad which have "substantial
and intended effects" within the United States may form the basis for criminal
prosecution pursuant to Section One of the Sherman Act. 49
Before one can clearly understand the import of the Nippon Paper decision and
its implications, one must comprehend the history of the United States' application
of its antitrust laws to foreign conduct. The Court first deliberated over the extra-
territorial application of the Sherman Act in 1909 in American Banana Company
v. United Fruit Co., (American Banana).'S American Banana involved allegations
that the defendant, United Fruit Co., intending to control the banana trade and
prevent competition, developed an elaborate scheme to prevent the plaintiff from
entering the market.' Allegations charged the defendant as having instigated the
Costa Rican government to impede the plaintiffs attempts to build a railway.152
This railway would have been the plaintiffs sole means of export. 53 Additionally,
the plaintiff complained the defendant, through strategic outbidding, drove pur-
chasers out of the market and precluded American Banana from buying for
export.'4 Although this activity was clearly anticompetitive, all illegal activity took
place in territory outside of the United States, in Panama, Columbia, and Costa
Rica. 55 Justice Holmes wrote, "[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of
the country where the act is done... For another jurisdiction, if it should happen
to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions, rather than those
of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an
interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent."' 56 The Supreme Court
ultimately held the defendant foreign corporation's acts beyond the jurisdiction of
the United States courts.157
148. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909).
149. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 E3d 1. 6 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 685
(1998).
150. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 347.
151. Id. at 354.
152. Id
153. Id
154. Id. at 355.
155. Id.
156. See American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356 (holding what the defendant did was not within the scope of the
Sherman Act, Justice Holmes wrote, "The foregoing considerations would lead, in case of doubt, to a construction
of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker
has geneial and legitimate power. All legislation is prima facie territorial"). Id.
157. Id. at 357.
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The Supreme Court, over time, began to break down the territorial walls which
it established in American Banana.58 In 1945, the United States Court of Appeals
broadly expanded the application of the Sherman Act to foreign nations. 59 In
United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, (Alcoa) the court considered application
of the Sherman Act to an agreement made entirely in a foreign state.' 6 The Court
of Appeals held that the Sherman Act would extend to civil antitrust actions
predicated on wholly foreign conduct having intended and substantial effect in the
United States.1 61 Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, wrote "It is settled law
... that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders
which the state reprehends.' 62 Alcoa broadly extended the reach of the Sherman
Act in civil cases. 63
Over time, dissatisfaction with Alcoa and its failure to accommodate interests
of other nations and international law grew. 64 This led the Court in 1976 to
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Sav. (Timberlane) and
an approach to extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act which considered
international law standards and notions of sovereignty. 165 The Timberlane court
developed a three part balancing test to determine the point at which judicial
158. See JAMEsR. ATWOOD & KINGMANBREWSTER, ANTIRUSTAND AMERICANBUSINESS ABROAD 146 (2d
ed. McGraw-Hill, 1981) (explaining that as the Supreme Court slowly broke down the territorial walls, the Court
always found a territorial nexus, meaning that it never extended jurisdiction to foreign conduct unless there was
some allegation of activity within the United States territory). For example, in United States v. 383, 340 Ounces
of Quinine Derivatives, Admiralty No-98-242 (SDNY 1928), the presence in the United States of the imported
commodity provided sufficient territorial nexus to extend jurisdiction. Id.
159. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (Alcoa) 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See ATWOOD &
BREWSTER, supra note 158, at 147 (indicating the Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit heard the case because
the Supreme Court could not assemble a quorum of disinterested justices).
160. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 423 (involving a suit by the U.S. government to break up an international
aluminum monopoly). Aluminum producers engaged in price fixing in an effort to increase prices in the United
States. Id.
161. lit at 444.
162. Id. at443.
163. Id. at 444. See Wu, supra note 108, at 10 (referring to the Alcoa test as the "intended effects" test).
164. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "comity" to mean that the courts of one
state or jurisdiction giv[e] effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of
obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect); see also ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 158, at 159
(explaining Alcoa focused solely on the effects of anticompetitive activity in the United States, ignoring basic
principles of positive comity and international law). The Alcoa test did not consider the consequences for other
nations. Id. Alcoa could potentially result in the application of United States laws to foreign conduct in situations
in which notions of comity would direct otherwise. Id.
165. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say., 749 F.2d 1378, 1379 (9th Cir.
1984) (involving an Oregonian partnership engaged in purchasing and distributing lumber and attempting to
establish itself in Honduras). The partnership sought to export lumber to the United States. id. The Honduran firms,
displeased with the prospect of an American corporation operating on its soil, attempted to drive Timberlane out
of the country. Id. Concerted efforts by the Honduran firms eventually resulted in Timberlane Lumber Co.'s
inability to operate in Honduras. Id.
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abstention is appropriate for wholly extraterritorial violations of the Sherman Act.'6
Specifically, the Court asked: (1) Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it
intended to affect, the foreign commerce of the United States? (2) Is it of such a
type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the Sherman Act? (3)
As a matter of international comity and fairness, should the extraterritorial juris-
diction of the United States be asserted to cover it?' 67 This approach moderated the
Alcoa test which looked only to the affects of extraterritorial activity, without con-
sidering the concerns of foreign nations.1 68 While moderating the test enumerated
in Alcoa, Timberlane placed the court in the awkward position of determining the
relative interests of the foreign state. 69 The decision received praise from the DOJ
and positive commentary for its consideration of international law and notions of
sovereignty, 170 and was adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law.
17 1
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Timberlane holding in 1993, in Hartford
Fire v. California (Hartford Fire), when it allowed a civil antitrust case to continue
under Section One of the Sherman Act, despite the fact that the illegal activities
occurred entirely in Great Britain.172 The Hartford Fire case involved allegations
that London reinsurers engaged in conspiracies to affect the market for insurance
in the United States. 173 The Hartford Fire court reaffirmed the intended effects
test,1 74 explaining it is "well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to
foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial
effect in the United States."'
75
166. Tuaberlane, 749 F.2d at 1382.
167. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say., 549 F.2d 597, 614-15 (9th Cir.
1976) (setting forth factors to examine in determining the third part of the test, including: the degree ofconflict with
foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business
of corporations; the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance; the relative
significance of effects on the United States compared with those elsewhere; the extent to which there is explicit
purpose to harm or affect American commerce; the foreseeability of such effect; and the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct with the United States as compared with conduct abroad).
168. See ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 158, at 160.
169. See Tamura, supra note 20, at 390 (explaining that the Timberlane method puts an added burden on the
court and citing Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena World Airways, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.) (1984), as an example of
the difficulties which courts face in applying balancing tests). These balancing tests involve political and diplomatic
deliberations potentially beyond the boundaries of thejudiciary. Id.
170. See ATWOOD & BRESWTER, supra note 158, at 162.
171. See RESTATEmEN (THIRD) OFFOREiGN RELATIONS LAw 244 (1987).
172. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (involving London and American reinsurers
diminishing the availability of certain types of insurance in the United States by entering into anticompetitive
agreements).
173. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 796.
174. Id.
175. Id.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 11
VI. UNITED STATES v. NIPPON PAPER
On March 17, 1997, the United States First Circuit Court of Appeals held in
United States v. Nippon Paper that activities committed abroad with substantial and
intended effect in the United States may form the basis for criminal prosecution
under Section One of the Sherman Act.176 On January 12, 1998, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari without comment. 77 The Supreme Court had already established
in Hartford Fire that the jurisdictional reach of Section One of the Sherman Act
extended in civil actions to wholly extraterritorial conduct with substantial and
intended effect in the United States. 78 Therefore, the Court only had to determine
whether the jurisdictional reach of Section One of the Sherman Act should be
applied in the same manner for criminal cases as it is in civil cases.1
79
The import of extending the Sherman Act to criminal prosecution for wholly
extraterritorial conduct is great.180 Violators may be subject to stiff penalties and
moral condemnation. Criminal prosecution is far more serious than civil liability.'
8
'
The DOJ prosecutes a violation of the Sherman Act as a felony. 8 2 Upon conviction,
corporations can be fined up to US$10,000,000 83 Similarly, individuals can be
fined up to US$350,000.184 Individuals and corporations may also be imprisoned for
up to three years, or by both fines and imprisonment.1 85 Corporate executives can
be personally indicted for participating in anticompetitive activity. 86 The Sherman
Act, combined with other existing federal legislation, can significantly increase the
already high penalties for Sherman Act violations. 87 For instance, the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, when combined with the Sherman Act, allows penalties for
violations of the Sherman Act to be based upon the violator's profit or the victim's
loss. 88 This extension of the Sherman Act to criminal prosecution also carries with
176. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (Ist Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998).
177. Id. See Japan, Nippon Fax Case Rejected, NAT. L. J., Jan. 12, 1998 (stating the Supreme Court rejected
the case without comment). Nippon lawyers argued that the criminal prosecutions should not be allowed because
the Sherman Act does not clearly say that it includes criminal penalties for wholly extraterritorial conduct. Id.
178. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 796.
179. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 9.
180. See infra notes 181-90 and accompanying text (discussing the penalties and moral stigma which
accompany criminal prosecution).
181. See infra notes 182-88 and accompanying text (noting the potential penalties for violation of the
Sherman Act).
182. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) (as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See WORLD ANTITRUST, supra note 11, at 7:2:2.
187. Id.; see also Plastic Dinnerware Price Fixing, supra note 102 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Anne
K. Bingaman in 1994 who said, "The days when corporate executives could regard antitrust penalties solely as a
business cost are over").
188. See WORLD ANTrrRUST, supra note 11, at 7:2:2
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it the stigma of moral condemnation.'8 9 Criminal prosecution is a formal and solemn
pronouncement of moral condemnation by the community.'
9
A. Facts
The facts in the Nippon Paper case are as follows: The United States brought
criminal charges against Nippon Paper Industries, Co., Ltd., (NPI) alleging a vio-
lation of Section One of the Sherman Act.191 NPI is a Japanese manufacturer of
thermal fax paper.' 92 A federal grand jury named NPI defendant in a 1995 indict-
ment.' 93 The indictment alleged that NPI engaged in anticompetitive activity con-
sisting of intra-industry meetings to discuss and fix prices. 94 These meetings
resulted in increased prices for fax paper in North America. 95 The conspirators
achieved their objective of inflating prices by selling-to unaffiliated trading houses
in Japan on the condition that these trading houses would sell the fax paper at
inflated prices to their subsidiaries in North America.196 Subsidiaries in the United
States then sold the fax paper to North American consumers at increased prices.
197
NPI oversaw the transactions to ensure that North American consumers paid
inflated prices for fax paper.98 None of the alleged criminal activity by NPI
occurred in the United States.199
B. Analysis
The merits of the Nippon Paper case rest largely on statutory construction. 20 0
The First Circuit first explains that criminal prosecution for wholly extraterritorial
conduct is "largely unchartered terrain" and that there is "no authority directly on
189. See George K. Gardner, Baily v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States, 33 B.U. L. REV.
176, 193 (1953) (explaining contempt by peers is punishment in itself).
190. See Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,405 (1958).
191. Nippon Paper, 109 F3d at 1.
192. Id. at9.
193. See Wilke, supra note 13, at Al (stating the indictment was part of a joint United States-Canadian
investigation into the fax paper industry and into allegations of anticompetitive behavior within the industry).
Several other Japanese fax paper companies were also indicted as a result of this joint investigation, including
Kanzaki and Mitsubishi Corp. Id.
194. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F. Supp. 55, 58 (1996) (quoting the indictment at
paragraph 7(b) which stated Nippon Paper and other Japanese fax paper companies "agreed to increase prices for
fax paper to be imported in North America"); see also Wilke, supra note 13, at Al (stating at the meetings the
Japanese fax paper companies discussed prices, major orders, and new products).
195. Nippon Paper 109 F.3d at 2.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id
200. Id. at 3.
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this point.'20 According to the First Circuit, it is common sense that courts should
interpret the same language in the same section of the same act uniformly, regard-
less of whether the impetus for interpretation is criminal or civil. The Hartford Fire
court affirmed that in civil cases Section One of the Sherman Act applied to wholly
extraterritorial conduct having substantial and intended effect in the United States.
The First Circuit explains accepted notions of statutory construction lead to the
same result for criminal prosecution, stating: "It is a fundamental interpretive
principle that identical words or terms used in different points of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning."202 Therefore, the Nippon Paper court con-
cludes Section One should be interpreted the same way in a criminal case. The First
Circuit further reasons that the words of Section One of the Sherman Act have not
changed since it held that wholly foreign conduct that has intended and substantial
effect in the United States comes within the jurisdictional reach of Section One of
the Sherman Act in civil actions.2' The First Circuit explains that there is no reason
to impute a different meaning to Section One simply because the case involved
criminal rather than civil allegations.204 The First Circuit reasons that to ascribe dif-
ferent meanings to the same language would be disingenuous.2' Therefore,
activities committed abroad with substantial and intended effects in the United
States may form the basis for criminal prosecution under Section One of the
Sherman Act.2°
NPI and the Japanese government, amicus for NPI, set forth five reasons to
support the argument that the reach of Section One should be measured differently
in the criminal context than in the civil context.0 7
First, NPI, and amicus, cite the lack of precedent on this issue.28 NPI argues
this is the first time the United States has sought to extend Section One of the
Sherman Act to criminal prosecution for wholly extraterritorial conduct.209 The First
Circuit's answer to this argument is twofold: (1) there is a first time for every-
thing,210 and (2) the argument overstates the lack of precedent, as there is a plethora
201. Id. at 4.
202. Nippon Paper, 109 E3d at 5 (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.
2d 615 (1994), a case in which a single criminal penalty clause used the term 'willfully violating' in several
provisions). Id. Identical terms in multiple places throughout a single statute normally have the same meaning. Id.
The RatzlafCourt interpreted the words 'willfully violating' as having the same meaning when applied in different
contexts. Id.
203. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 6.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at9.
207. Id. at 6.
208. Id. at 6.
209. Id. at 6.
210. See id. (concluding the lack of criminal actions under these circumstances is probably more a reflection
of recent increases in globalization than evidence that criminal prosecution is inappropriate in this situation).
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of analogous precedent.2 The First Circuit cites cases in which a state's criminal
statutes are applied to conduct which occurred entirely outside of the state's
borders212 and explains it is "not much of a stretch" to apply this concept inter-
nationally.2
13
NPI's second argument focuses upon the different strengths of presumption in
civil and criminal cases. NPI argues the presumption against extraterritoriality is
stronger in the criminal context than civil, pointing to United States v. Bowman
(Bowman) to support this proposition.2 4 In Bowman, the court cautioned that if the
criminal law "is to be extended to include those [crimes] committed outside of the
strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute, and
failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this regard., 215 The Nippon
Paper court explains the Bowman court never intended for a more resilient
presumption in criminal cases.216 Instead, Bowman merely reaffirmed the classic
presumption against extraterritoriality which had been established in American
Banana."7 The court further explains, contrary to NPI's argument, Bowman actually
supported the idea that the presumption is the same in criminal and civil
proceedings.218
NPI further relies on the Restatement 3 of Foreign Relations Law and asserts
Section 403 supports a distinction in criminal and civil cases dealing with extra-
territorial activity.219 Specifically NPI points to Comment f of Section 403 which
reads, in part:
In the case of regulatory statutes that may give rise to both civil and
criminal liability, such as the United States antitrust and securities laws, the
presence of substantial foreign elements will ordinarily weigh against
application of criminal law. In such cases, legislative intent to subject
211. See id. at 6 (citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) as analogous precedent). The
Strassheim Court held, "Acts done outside ajurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects
within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should
succeed getting him within its power." Id.
212. Nippon Paper, 109 .3d at 6.
213. Id.
214. See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 6 (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed.
149 (1922).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id
218. See id. at 6 n.4 (explaining that Nippon Paper further relied on United States v. United States Gypsum,
438 U.S. 422 (1978) to support the argument that different strengths of presumption apply in criminal and civil
cases). Gypsum held that to convict under the Sherman Act, criminal intent is required, but went on to explain that
intent is not always a requirement for criminal prosecution. Id. Criminal intent is not a requirement when the
conduct is per se illegal because of unquestionably anticompetitive effects. Id. Therefore, the Gypsum court did
not differentiate between criminal and civil antitrust cases and does not support different strengths of presumption
in criminal and civil cases. Id.
219. Nippon Paper, 109 F3d at 7.
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conduct outside the state's territory to its criminal law should be found only
on the basis of express statement or clear implication.22 °
The Nippon Paper court refutes this argument, noting the Restatement simply
reaffirms the "classic presumption against extraterritoriality."221 The Nippon Paper
court explains a determination whether or not to prosecute wholly extraterritorial
conduct is discretionary.222
NPI next claims Section One of the Sherman Act should not extend to criminal
prosecution for wholly extraterritorial conduct because of the rule of lenity.223 The
rule of lenity provides, "In the course of interpreting statutes in criminal cases, a
reviewing court should resolve ambiguities affecting a statute's scope in the de-
fendant's favor."'224 According to the Nippon Paper court, there is no ambiguity in
the present case.2 Therefore, the rule of lenity is not applicable.226 The Supreme
Court in Hartford Fire conclusively established that Section One of the Sherman
Act applies to wholly extraterritorial conduct.227 An ambiguity does not exist merely
because the courts and commentators have questioned the statute's interpretation.228
The court explains the rule of lenity is inapplicable to the situation in the present
case, and is suited only for those situations in which, after "seizing everything from
which aid can be derived, [a court] can make no more than a guess as to what
Congress intended." 9 Therefore, the court ruled this argument is not applicable to
the present situation."
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS, § 403 cmt. F (1987) (stating in full, "The
principles governing jurisdiction to prescribe set forth in § 402 and in this section apply to criminal as well as to
civil regulation. However, in the case of regulatory statutes that may give rise to both civil and criminal liability,
such as the United States antitrust and securities laws, the presence of substantial foreign elements will ordinarily
weigh against application of criminal law. In such cases, legislative intent to subject conduct outside the state's
territory to its criminal law should be found only on the basis of express statement or clear implication").
221. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 7.
222. Id.
223. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "rule of lenity" as follows: "Where the
intention of Congress is not clear from the act itself and reasonable minds might differ as to its intention, the court
will adopt the less harsh meaning. . . The judicial doctrine by which courts decline to interpret criminal statutes
so as to increase penalty imposed, absent clear evidence of legislative intent to do otherwise; in other words, where
there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of defendant... Under rule of lenity, statute
establishing penalty which is susceptible of more than one meaning should be construed so as to provide most
lenient penalty"). Id.
224. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 7.
225. Id. at 8.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
1998 / U.S. Extension of the Sherman Act
NPI bases its final argument on the notion of international comity.21 Inter-
national comity is "a doctrine that counsels voluntary forbearance when a sovereign
which has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction concludes that a second sovereign also
has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction under principles of international law.''232 The
Nippon Paper court explains, however, that the notion of international comity is
appropriate only in two situations. International comity is appropriate only when
the laws of a country would require a defendant to act in a manner incompatible
with the Sherman Act or in situations in which full compliance with the statutory
schemes of both countries is impossible.' NPI's international comity argument is
attenuated in this situation because both Japanese and United States laws condemn
NPI's actions as illegal.2 5
C. Reactions
Extension of United States antitrust laws to criminal prosecution for wholly
extraterritorial conduct has sparked criticism by a number of foreign nations, parti-
cularly Japan.z 6 The Japanese government entered the Nippon Paper case as amicus
to Nippon Paper and argued that a finding against NPI would be a violation of inter-
national law and traditional notions of sovereignty. 7 Critics of the Nippon Paper
case cite this as simply another example of the United States overreaching its limits
on the international stage238 and critics note that this overreaching by the United
231. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "comity of nations" as "[t]he recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who
are under the protection of its laws"); see also Nippon Paper 109 F.3d at 8.
232. Nippon Paper 109 F.3d at 8.
233. ld.
234. Id
235. Id.
236. Wilke, supra note 13, at Al.
237. See Wu, supra note 108, at 6 (defining "sovereign immunity" as a doctrine of international law where
domestic courts must refrain from asserting jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns); see also Wilke, supra, note 13,
at Al (explaining the entry of Japan into the case increased the stakes).
238. See Wilke, supra note 13, at Al (noting that critics point to the Helms-Burton Act as another example
of the United States reaching beyond its borders and into the sovereignty of other nations); see also Kern Alexander,
Trafficking in Expropriated Property: Civil Liability Under Helms.Burton, 8 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 65, 78 (1997)
(stating the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, otherwise known as the Helms-Burton Act, was designed
to increase pressure on the Castro regime). During the 1959 revolution, the Cuban government expropriated without
compensation the property of U.S. entities and Cuban nationals. Id. Title III of the act would allow the Cuban
nationals whose property was expropriated without compensation to sue any foreigners who benefit from the use
of confiscated property. Id. The language of the act is broad, so broad that to fall within the ambit of this Act, one
need only directly or indirectly benefit from confiscated property. Id. For example, all banks which make loans to
persons who benefit economically from expropriated property, either directly or indirectly, will be subject to
liability in U.S. Courts. Id. Any company with direct or indirect business dealings in Cuba and a U.S. presence
would be subject to lawsuits in U.S. Courts. Id.
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States often meets with retaliation or protective measures by foreign nations.239
Many economists and trade experts have similar reservations about the Nippon
Paper decision. ° William Niskanen, former Reagan-administration chief
economist, believes the policy violates the spirit of trade law.24 Robert Litan, a
former official at the DOJ, warns forbearance is appropriate in particular
circumstances.2 42 Litan explains the United States' assertion of jurisdiction abroad
may be necessary at times, but states doing so "can create real economic and
foreign policy conflicts with other countries, so we need to pick these cases
carefully."24 3 Of particular importance to this discussion, the Japanese government
has warned that the Nippon Paper decision could seriously frustrate efforts by Japan
antitrust enforcement officials to coordinate competition laws between the United
States and Japan.244
VII. CONCLUSION
The Nippon Paper decision and reactions by the Japanese government point to
the difficulties which the United States faces in its efforts to effectively enforce
transnational violations of antitrust law.245 The argument regarding the enforcement
oftransnational antitrust violations is circular. Coordination and positive comity are
effective solutions to the crisis in transnational enforcement of antitrust law. These
approaches are mindful of international law and sovereignty concerns. They have
proven to be successful in many situations.246 Nevertheless, full realization of suc-
cess through these approaches often takes a long time. In the mean time, the United
States must protect itself from the damaging effects of foreign anticompetitive
activity.247 Therefore, the United States resorts to application of its laws to wholly
239. See Alexander, supra note 238, at 78 (explaining that critics disapprove of the Helms-burton act as a
violation of international law). Several countries reacted to the passage of the Helms-Burton Act with self-protective
measures. Id. Canada and Mexico, for example, both condemn the United States' actions as violative of
international law and have taken actions to avoid the ramifications of the act. Id. Mexico's Senate recently approved
a law which imposes sanctions upon Mexican companies that submit to the lawsuits and sanctions imposed by the
United States. Id.
240. Wilke, supra note 13, at Al.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See supra notes 236-44 and accompanying text (noting the decision has sparked criticism by a number
of foreign nations, including Japan). Japan warned that the Nippon Paper decision could seriously undermine efforts
by Japanese antitrust enforcement officials to coordinate competition laws between the United States and Japan.
Id.
246. See supra notes 73-122 and accompanying text (discussing coordination and positive comity as
approaches to the transnational enforcement of antitrust law and recent successes through these approaches).
247. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text (noting that Japan is a leading U.S. trade partner). It is
a nation fraught with anticompetitive activity. Id Japan's failure to effectively enforce its antitrust laws to the extent
desired by the United States hurts American businesses and consumers. Id.
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extraterritorial conduct.2' This application of U.S. law to foreign conduct often
hinders efforts which have been made through positive comity and impedes
attempts to coordinate enforcement activity.249 Application of U.S. laws leads many
nations to self-protective measures and an unwillingness to continue negotiations
towards effective coordinated enforcement activity.2
This appears to be the situation which the United States presently confronts
with Japan. Efforts through positive comity and towards coordinated enforcement
action have been forward moving at a painstakingly slow pace. " The inherent
social and economic differences between the United States and Japan make this a
particularly difficult process.252 Full realization of coordinated enforcement action
between the United States and Japan may take years, if it is ever fully achieved. In
the mean time, Japan's lax enforcement of its antitrust laws is having serious effects
on the United States economy1 3 In order to protect U.S. consumers and businesses,
U.S. officials have increased the stakes for foreign individuals and businesses by
extending the Sherman Act to include criminal prosecution for wholly extra-
territorial antitrust violations which have substantial effect within the United
States. 4 The United States' goal, enforcement of transnational antitrust violations
through positive comity and coordinated enforcement action, may be hindered by
this recent decision2 5 However, this may be the only means by which the United
States can protect American consumers and corporations from Japan's failure to
effectively enforce its antitrust laws. 6
248. See supranotes 123-43 and accompanying text (detailing the third approach, application ofU.S. antitrust
laws to foreign conduct, and concluding this approach is the least effective of the three).
249. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the implementation of blocking statutes as an
obstacle to foreign judgments).
250. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text (explaining many nations enact blocking statutes which
limit access to evidence or limit the U.S. judgments).
251. Seesupranotes 76-77 and accompanyingtext (detailing efforts which Japan has made towards achieving
effective enforcement of transnational antitrust violations).
252. See supra notes 35-71 and accompanying text (discussing the development of economic systems in the
United States and Japan and key differences which make the coordination of antitrust enforcement activity between
the United States and Japan particularly difficult).
253. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text (noting the particular importance to developing an
effective system for enforcing antitrust violations between the United States and Japan). See generally Seita &
Tamura, supra note 24 (stating that Japan is a leading United States trade partner).
254. See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at I.
255. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (explaining that the Japanese government threatened that
this decision could frustrate efforts by Japanese antitrust officials to coordinate competition laws between the United
States and Japan).
256. See Klein & Bansal, supra note 25, at 192 (writing "Until, however, the full potential of the approaches
of coordination and positive comity are realized through commitment by each country... we have no choice to
keep open the option of applying our own laws to conduct occurring abroad but having effects within our territory.
In short, at least for now, only through the application of all three approaches can effective antitrust enforcement
be achieved in global industries").
